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HILLMAN V. ANDRUS: THE GHOST OF CIVIL POSSESSION
Ross E. Tuminello*
This case presents unresolved issues in Louisiana property law
with respect to acquisitive prescription and possession of
immovables. Particularly, Hillman requires consideration of the
relationship, or lack thereof, between the doctrine of civil
possession and the vice of discontinuity. Although undecided
definitively by Louisiana courts, the issue has largely been a
subject of academic discussion among French and Louisiana
commentators. This case note seeks to identify the solution used by
the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Hillman as well as
two other possible solutions that have gained academic support.
I. BACKGROUND
This case involves a property dispute over the ownership of a
.94 acre tract of land. 1 The parties were record owners of two
contiguous tracts. 2 The plaintiff purchased the northern tract in
2007. 3 The act of sale specifically described the .94 acre tract as
one of three tracts being conveyed. 4 The act of sale also identified
the property as being located in Evangeline Parish and referenced a
survey map annexed thereto. 5

* Juris Doctor and Graduate Diploma in Comparative Law, LSU Paul M.
Hebert Law Center (2013); B.S., E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisiana
State University (2009). I send many thanks to Alexandru-Daniel On for his
help in addressing these complex property law issues. I would also like to thank
Camille Meehan and Professor Olivier Moréteau for their translation of French
legal sources.
1. Hillman v. Andrus, 2011-5 (La. App. 3d Cir. 5/4/11), 63 So. 3d 1164.
2. Id. at 1166.
3. Id. at 1165.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1172.
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The defendants purchased the southern tract in 1977. 6 The act
of sale conveyed 2.07 acres of land located in St. Landry Parish. 7
The document included a list of calls and specifically provided that
“said property being bounded now or formerly as follows: North
by Bayou DeCannes.” 8
Sometime later, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were
encroaching on the .94 acre tract of land. 9 He filed the action to
have the boundary between the two tracts designated as the line
dividing Evangeline Parish and St. Landry Parish. 10 The
defendants reconvened asserting ownership of the .94 acre tract by
title or alternatively by thirty-year acquisitive prescription. 11 The
parties agreed that Bayou DeCannes was rerouted to the north from
its original location some time prior to the defendant’s
acquisition. 12 To prove possession, the defendants claimed that
they had maintained the property for thirty years and that their
children had periodically used the land for recreational purposes.13
However, the record also indicated that in 1981 the defendants
moved away from their property for six years. 14 During this time,
other individuals lived in the defendants’ home but never entered
the disputed .94 acre tract. 15
6. In 1994, the defendant purchased an adjacent tract increasing his
ownership to four acres. The act of sale similarly described the property as lying
within St. Landry Parish and being bound on the north by Bayou DeCannes. A
list of calls was likewise provided.
7. Id. at 1166.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The line dividing the two parishes is also the former centerline of
Bayou DeCannes.
11. Id. at 1167.
12. Id. at 1166-67. The disputed .94 acre tract was that piece of land bound
on the south by the former channel of the bayou and on the north by the current
channel.
13. Id. at 1170.
14. Id. at 1171.
15. Id. The Court did not explore the relationship between these individuals
and the defendants. However, the language of the opinion appears to treat them
as precarious possessors. The only mention of these individuals was that “no
evidence existed regarding the extent these individuals may have ‘possessed’ the
property during that period.” In any event, they were likewise treated as if they
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II. DECISION OF THE COURT
The trial court sustained the defendants’ exception of
prescription for two reasons. 16 First, the trial court determined that
the defendants had acquired ownership of the .94 acre tract by
thirty year acquisitive prescription. 17 Second, the trial court
concluded that the defendants were entitled to a presumption of
ownership by virtue of having possessed the tract in excess of one
year free from vice. 18 For these reasons, the trial court declared the
defendants to be owners of the .94 acre tract and dismissed the
plaintiff’s suit. 19
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s
determination of acquisitive prescription, concluding that the
defendants’ possession 20 had been tainted by discontinuity. 21 The
Court’s decision rested firmly on the fact that the defendants had
left their home for six years. 22 Critically, the majority found that
the defendants’ “lack of evidence regarding this period of time”
precluded a finding of continuous possession for thirty years. 23
The Court then addressed the plaintiff’s demand to fix the
boundary and the defendants’ alternative argument of ownership
by title. The Court held that the plaintiff’s title “very clearly
includes the disputed property.” 24 In support of that conclusion, the

never stepped foot on the disputed tract. Thus, they remained within the
defendants’ record boundaries. For that reason, precarious possession analysis
and eviction analysis are made irrelevant in the context of possessing the
disputed tract. See id. at 1171.
16. Id. at 1167-68.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1168.
19. Id. at 1169. The trial court’s acquisitive prescription determination
rendered it unnecessary to address defendant’s alternative argument of
ownership by title.
20. In fact, the Court questioned whether the defendants ever engaged in
acts sufficient to support corporeal possession, but simply assumed it as fact for
the sake of analysis and discussion. Id. at 1170.
21. Id. at 1170.
22. Id. at 1171.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1172.

330

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

Court emphasized that the plaintiff’s deed of acquisition referenced
a survey naming the .94 tract as one of three tracts being sold and
showing the southern border as the old centerline of Bayou
DeCannes. 25 The Court also pointed to the deficiency of evidence
presented by the defendants to prove that the disputed tract was
included within his call list measurements or that his northern
border fell within Evangeline Parish. 26 However, the Court
declined to “fix” 27 the boundary. 28 Rather, the Court simply
recognized that the plaintiff’s title, which designated the southern
boundary as the old centerline of Bayou DeCannes, was superior to
the defendants’ title. 29
III. COMMENTARY
The troubling feature of this opinion is the Court’s
determination that possession was not continuous during the
defendants’ six-year absence without any discussion of civil
possession. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 provides that
possession must be continuous. Possession is discontinuous when
it is not exercised at regular intervals, and possession that is
discontinuous has no legal effect. 30 However, Louisiana Civil
Code article 3431 instructs that “once acquired, possession is
retained by the intent to possess as owner [animus domini] even if
the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.” 31 Further, the intent
to retain possession is presumed unless there is clear proof of a
contrary intention. 32
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1172-73.
27. After considering the evidence, including the testimony and exhibits of
a surveyor or other expert appointed by the court or by a party, the court shall
render judgment fixing the boundary between the contiguous lands in
accordance with the ownership or possession of the parties. LA. C.C.P. Art.
3693.
28. Id. at 1173.
29. Id.
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435 and 3436.
31. Emphasis added.
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432.
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As stated in the introductory remarks, legal commentators have
identified at least three possible solutions to resolve the apparent
tension between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. The
first solution is the traditional French view, which treats the
doctrine of civil possession and the vice of discontinuity as two
wholly distinct and separate concepts. This is the solution that the
court in Hillman appeared to use. The second solution, supported
by Professor A.N. Yiannopoulos, recognizes a relationship
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity whereby a
possessors’ animus, sufficient to support civil possession, is
affected by subsequent acts of corporeal possession or a lack
thereof. The third solution is the modern French view, which also
recognizes a relationship between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. Under this view, civil possession requires acts of
corpus by a precarious possessor in the actual owner or possessor’s
absence.
A. The Traditional French View
Although the Third Circuit in Hillman did not expressly
identify the position underlying their judgment, the reasoning
seems to align with the traditional French view. Under that theory,
as explained by Planiol:
Possession exists just as soon as its two essential elements,
the corpus and the animus are united. It, however, can be
affected by certain vices that make it useless, principally
for the bringing of possessory actions and for the
acquisition of ownership by prescription. These two effects,
which are the principal advantages of possession, are
attached solely to a possession free of vices (or defects). A
vice of possession is therefore a certain state of affairs
which, without destroying possession, makes it juridically
valueless. 33

33. MARCEL PLANIOL. 1 PLANIOL CIVIL LAW TREATISE (PART 2) 346-47
(West 1939).
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Thus, according to Planiol, the acquisition and maintenance of
possession, whether it be by corporeal, civil, or constructive
possession, is a matter wholly independent from the determination
of whether such possession can result in ownership by acquisitive
prescription. In that sense, it may very well be that a party satisfies
the requirements of civil possession. However, for purposes of
acquisitive prescription, that civil possession remains subject to the
ordinary vices of possession—namely, discontinuity.
Broadly speaking, the traditional French view posits that no
relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. Subsequent gaps between acts of corpus sufficient to
trigger the vice of discontinuity will not then destroy a civil
possession. Rather, those gaps simply preclude the possibility of
having civil possession blossom into ownership by prescription.
This appears to be the view adopted by the court in Hillman, and
under those facts, the result would appear correct. However, one
would be apt to question whether the Louisiana Civil Code
supports the traditional French view. Under Louisiana Civil Code
article 3476, the possessor must have corporeal possession, 34 or
civil possession preceded by corporeal possession, to acquire a
thing by prescription. Thus, the Civil Code seems to suggest that
some relationship exists between civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
B. Professor Yiannopoulos’ View
Professor Yiannopoulos’ view promotes a logical relationship
between the doctrine of civil possession and the vice of
discontinuity. 35 Again, it is important to note that civil possession
is the retention of possession solely by the intent to possess as
owner. 36 That intent is presumed in the absence of a clear proof of
34. Corporeal possession is the exercise of physical acts of use, detention,
or enjoyment over a thing. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3425.
35. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 528 (1991).
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3431.
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a contrary intention. 37 On the other hand, possession must be
continuous for purposes of acquisitive prescription, 38 and
discontinuous possession has no legal effect. 39 Referring to these
principles, Professor Yiannopoulos observes that:
There is an apparent conflict between the notion of civil
possession and the requirement that possession be
continuous. . . . Properly understood, the two sets of
provisions are fully reconcilable. In the first place,
continuity of possession is more significant in cases
involving the issue of whether possession has been
acquired rather than retained. Second, depending on the
nature of the property, long intervals in the exercise of
possession may constitute sufficient evidence to rebut the
presumption of retention of possession. 40
There are three main ideas to take away from Professor
Yiannopoulos’ commentary. First, he recognizes a relationship
between civil possession and the vice of discontinuity. His view is
phrased in terms of the affirmative requirement of continuity under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3476. This notion reflects the
reciprocal paradigm of possession attributes within the Louisiana
Civil Code. Louisiana Civil Code article 3476 affirmatively
requires that possession be continuous for purposes of acquisitive
prescription. Conversely, Louisiana Civil Code article 3435
provides that discontinuous possession, possession not exercised at
regular intervals, has no legal effect.
Following this idea, he recognizes that long intervals in the
exercise of corpus may be used to prove that the possessor no
longer has the requisite animus sufficient to support civil
possession. 41 As a result, civil possession would cease altogether
under Louisiana Civil Code article 3433, which provides that
37. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3435.
40. Yiannopoulos, supra note 35, at 550.
41. It should be noted that this view does not purport to require corpus to
sustain civil possession, but, rather, that corporeal acts are simply used as proof
of the existence or lack thereof of animus.
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possession is lost upon a corresponding loss of animus. This is
precisely the relationship that the Louisiana Civil Code seems to
suggest when evaluating civil possession sufficient to support
acquisitive prescription.
Third, his observations can be understood as altering the
continuity standard between the successive acts of corpus required
to obtain corporeal possession and the successive acts of corpus
required to retain possession through civil possession. Stated
simply, the continuity standard is relaxed once the possessor has
acquired corporeal possession and is subsequently attempting to
lean on civil possession. Thus, under Yiannopoulos’ view, the
primary issue is how lengthy the gaps in between successive acts
of corpus can be in order to support civil possession. The issue
does not lend itself to any black letter rule of law largely due to the
fact-sensitive nature of possession disputes. 42 Nevertheless, there
is some guidance.
Article 3444 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provided that
the presumption of intent to retain possession existed no longer
than ten years without “actual possession.” 43 However, this article
was subsequently repealed by the legislature, and the Civil Code
continues to lack any express limitation on the length of civil
possession. The reason for removing former article 3444 is
unclear, but one might speculate that it was intended to
accommodate current Louisiana Civil Code article 3433. Tracking
the language of article 3433, 44 Professor Yiannopoulos explains
when civil possession is lost:
With respect to corporeal things, civil possession is
presumed to exist and to last until possession is abandoned
or the possessor is evicted by another person. Like
ownership, which cannot be lost by non-use, possession
42. Rathborne v. Hale, 667 So. 2d 1197, 1201.
43. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432. Corporeal possession is likely
the intended equivalent of “actual possession.”
44. Possession is lost when the possessor manifests his intention to abandon
it or when he is evicted by another by force or usurpation. LA. CIV. CODE art.
3433.
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continues for an indeterminate period of time as civil
possession. However, civil possession may be affected by
the vice of discontinuity (abandonment). Possession may be
maintained by the intent to have the thing as one’s own for
as long as the thing remains materially at the disposal of the
possessor (eviction). 45
Thus, civil possession is extinguished as a consequence of
either: (1) abandonment, 46 or the loss of animus as affected by the
vice of discontinuity or (2) eviction. The concept of abandonment
and Yiannopoulos’ view that animus can be destroyed by long
intervals in the exercise of possession are consistent with the idea
of civil possession from the Civil Code. “Abandonment is
predicated on a manifestation of the intent to abandon, which may
be established in light of objective criteria.” That objective criteria
includes whether the possessor has exercised sufficient acts of
possession on the land as determined by the very nature of the land
in question.
“The nature of the land or the use to which it is destined
governs the possession necessary to support prescription.” 47 That
is to say that the nature of the land or the use to which it is destined
may provide insight into what a “regular interval” is under
Louisiana Civil Code article 3436, 48 such that possession does not
become discontinuous. Under Yiannopoulos’ view, the regular
intervals between successive acts of corpus necessary to “retain”
possession may be longer than those intervals required in order to
“acquire” possession.

45. Yiannopoulos, supra note 43, at 528.
46. Comment (c), LA. CIV. CODE art. 3433.
47. McDaniel v. Roy O. Martin Lumber Co., Inc., 560 So. 2d 676, 680 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). See also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Landry,
558 So.2d 242, 244 (La. 1990).
48. “Possession is…discontinuous when it is not exercised at regular
intervals…” LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3436.
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C. Modern French View
In France, a school of thought emerged suggesting that, in
addition to the intent to possess as owner, possession always
requires corpus. The physical presence may be accomplished by
the original possessor or through a precarious possessor. 49 In case
of precarious possession, the original possessor retains possession
through his intent to possess as owner in addition to the precarious
possessor’s actual physical presence. This does not mean that
possession is exercised without corpus. Corpus is exercised by
someone else. Modern French doctrine has made a very subtle
distinction between possession solo animo, and discontinuous
possession:
One may legitimately believe that the one who possesses
by his sole intent, animo solo, cannot exert possession in a
continuous manner, that is to say in all occasions and at all
moments where it should be continuous. One may also say
that possession solo animo comes close to discontinuous
possession. As a matter of fact, it seems that the rule of solo
animo possession acknowledges that possession may be
kept even in the absence of acts of possession. This may be
true, but only in the absence of discontinuity, namely in
those instances where the owner, once in possession, would
not have normally accomplished acts of possession, due to
the nature of the premises and their prevailing use....
[I]ntermittent acts do not exclude continuity, provided they
do not result in a discrepancy that goes against the idea of
possession, and if they are covered by anterior or
subsequent acts of possession. 50
Although the argument could be made under the language of
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431, it is unlikely that the modern
French view could find support in light of the judicial
interpretation given to article 3431. It is worth noting, once again,
49. By “precarious possession” I mean the exercise of possession over a
thing with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor (LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3437).
50. Jamel Djoudi, Possession, at no. 49, published in 9 RÉPERTOIRE DE
DROIT CIVIL (Dalloz 2012) (citations omitted).

2013]

HILLMAN V. ANDRUS

337

that Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 expressly provides that
“Once acquired, possession is retained by the intent to possess as
owner even if the possessor ceases to possess corporeally.” Also,
the Louisiana Civil Code expressly allows that acquisitive
prescription run in favor of a civil possessor who previously held
corporeal possession. 51
Louisiana Civil Code article 3429 provides that “possession
may be exercised by the possessor or by another who holds the
thing for him and in his name. Thus a lessor possesses through his
lessee.” However, nowhere in the code or the cases interpreting
Louisiana Civil Code article 3431 is it required that precarious
possession support civil possession (solo animo). In fact, quite the
contrary is indicated throughout. Comment (c) Louisiana Civil
Code article 3431 is instructive and provides that:
Civil possession is the retention of the possession of a thing
merely by virtue of the intent to own it, as when a person,
without intending to abandon possession ceases to reside in
a house or on the land which he previously occupied or
when a person ceases to exercise physical control over a
movable without intending to abandon possession. 52
Further, acts sufficient to support civil possession are those
such as payment of taxes or the execution of juridical acts affecting
the thing, such as a lease. Moreover, vestiges of works, such as the
ruins of a house, may signify civil possession. These activities
require no actual presence on the land by anyone and appear to
indicate that the modern French view is quite different to the
requirements under the Louisiana Civil Code.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, in Hillman, the court’s apparent use of
the traditional French view had a compelling and arguably
prejudicial effect on the litigation. Generally, the party pleading
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3476.
52. Emphasis added.
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acquisitive prescription bears the burden of proving all essential
facts. 53 Indeed, in Hillman the court based its judgment on a lack
of evidence presented by the defendants proving corporeal
possession during their six-year absence. Had the civil possession
articles been employed, the defendants would have only needed to
prove that they had acquired possession of the disputed tract. As a
result, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving a contrary
intention by clear proof—a much more burdensome standard than
a preponderance. Unfortunately for the defendants in Hillman, they
were left carrying the burden of proof at trial, affording the
plaintiff a substantial litigious advantage.

53. See Hooper v. Hooper, 941 So. 2d 726.

